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The Duty to Creditors Reconsidered-
Filling a Much Needed Gap in Corporation Law
PERHAPS THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION of corporation law is: To whom does
the board of directors of a corporation owe its fiduciary duty? This question has
been debated in one form or another for the last century.' Recently, the question
has shifted to whether and under what circumstances the board of directors has a
duty to maximize stockholder wealth.' It is probably fair to say that most observers
agree that the stockholders are the ultimate owners of a corporation, and are thus
entitled to have the board of directors manage the corporation in the manner that
would best serve their interests. There is, however, a significant contingent that
argues that the duty of the board of directors should be more broadly construed to
include other constituencies or stakeholders such as creditors, customers, suppliers,
employees, and the community at large.' This view sounds expansive, but in prac-
tice the question whether creditors have standing to recover from management, its
Marbury Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 196-97 (Rev. ed. 1968); E. Merrick
Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1156 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Milton Friedman, The
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, Sunday Magazine, at 33.
2. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. 1989). See also MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 97 (1994); FRANK H. EAS-
TERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 28-30 (1991); Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 263 (1999); D. Gordon
Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1176 (1981).
3. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW.
2253, 2253 (1990); James J. Hanks, Jr., Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time Should
Never Have Come, 3 Insights 12 (1989); Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1273, 1281-82 (1991); Marleen A. O'Connor,
Corporate Malaise-Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 3, 4 (1991). See also Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management, supra note 2, at 1192 ("A manager responsible to two
conflicting interests is in fact answerable to neither.").
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agents, or a controlling stockholder usually occurs only if the corporation ends up
in bankruptcy.4
The conventional wisdom is that creditors can and must protect themselves by
contract. They have no standing to sue on grounds that sound in mismanagement
or even self-dealing. They cannot ordinarily maintain a derivative action on behalf
of the corporation or a direct action on their own behalf for breach of fiduciary
duty.' On the other hand, it is clear that parties to a contract owe each other a duty
of good faith and fair dealing. Presumably, a creditor may recover from the corpo-
ration on such a theory. That is an unremarkable proposition if the corporation is
solvent even though it is notoriously difficult for creditors to make out a case in
such circumstances.6 But what if the corporation is insolvent? Practically speaking,
the only question of any real moment is whether creditors can recover from some-
one else-namely management, its agents, or a controlling stockholder 7
4. Although other constituency statutes address the interests of a wider range of stakeholders, presumably
only those with monetizable claims (i.e., creditors) would ever be able to recover. This is not to say that other
constituency statutes give rise to a cause of action for damages. Most such statutes are permissive rather than
mandatory, and needless to say, creditors have independent standing to sue the corporation in the event of
default. The precise question addressed here is whether the board of directors may be held liable to creditors
personally. Liability may also extend to officers and controlling stockholders under some circumstances. Of
course, there may be other potential third party defendants such as accountants, lawyers, banks and others who
may have somehow facilitated losses suffered by the corporation. Moreover, in most cases, third parties will
have a direct relationship to the corporation that is similar to that of management. In other words, their
primary duty or legal relationship is to the corporation and likely cannot be enforced by creditors as third party
beneficiaries. On the other hand, creditors presumably may recover from third parties on theories such as
interference with contract. But that is essentially an extension of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Creditors may also recover by piercing the corporate veil. Indeed, it seems quite likely that most cases in which
the duty to creditors arises and in which creditors seek monetary relief would also be credible piercing cases.
Similar issues also arise when creditors seek equitable subordination of stockholder claims. See, e.g., Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311-12 (1939); Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1958).
5. This proposition is well established as a matter of common law and has been reduced to statute in
many jurisdictions insofar as derivative actions may be maintained only by stockholders. See MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 7.40 (2005); See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.01, Reporter's Note 1 and 2
(1992).
6. There may be circumstances in which creditors suffer short of bankruptcy. For example, in the 1989
leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco, the market value of RJR bonds fell dramatically and caused immediate
portfolio losses to bondholders even though RJR never became bankrupt. In a sense then, the creditors never
really suffered a loss. See Met. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1526, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
vacated, 906 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1990).
7. There is an obvious problem with direct recovery by a creditor. If the corporation is insolvent (or is
likely to become so), recovery by a creditor amounts to preferential treatment vis a vis other creditors. The
answer is to treat such claims as derivative. But some claims may not be derivative. In that case, the answer may
be that management owes no duty to creditors (other than a duty of good faith and fair dealing). On the other
hand, some such claims succeed. That is exactly what happens in piercing the corporate veil, although in such
cases recovery is typically against the stockholders of a closely held corporation. Arguably, it should be easier to
recover from the board of directors, because authority to manage the corporation resides in the board of
directors. Thus, it might also be argued that veil piercing proves afortiori that creditors should be able to assert
derivative claims against management. In those cases in which the courts have recognized that such claims
should be derivative, they have usually also held that creditors have no standing to maintain a derivative action.
Sometimes the courts offer no explanation for this proposition; sometimes they say it is because the statute says
so; and sometimes they say it is because management's fiduciary duty runs only to the benefit of the stockhold-
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In practice, none of this matters much. When a corporation falls into bank-
ruptcy, the bankruptcy court may or may not appoint a trustee.' If not, the debtor
in possession (DIP) is unlikely to pursue claims against the board of directors that
may have arisen in the zone of insolvency or indeed after insolvency. If a trustee is
appointed-a likely occurrence only if there has been a pattern of questionable
transactions-the trustee stands in the shoes of the corporation and may pursue
any claim that the corporation itself could pursue, presumably including claims
based on breach of fiduciary duty.9 The third possibility is that, for some reason,
the corporation remains outside bankruptcy. '
ers. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES o. CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.02, Reporter's Note 1 and 2 (1992). Although few would
object to such a statement of the law, it is in fact a rather extreme position. One would think that management
has a duty to the corporation rather than the stockholders. Indeed, to say that management owes a duty to the
stockholders is to suggest that the stockholders should be able to recover directly for most claims of misman-
agement. Yet clearly that is not the case. Most such claims belong to the corporation and thus must be pursued
derivatively. This is true of both common law claims and most statutory claims such as recovery of illegal
dividends and payments due in connection with issue of stock. As to the latter, the statute typically provides
that liability runs to the corporation. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.33 (2005). So why then are creditors
prohibited from maintaining derivative actions? One fallback position is that fiduciary duty should be inter-
preted in light of the interests of stockholders. In other words, what we mean when we say that management
owes its fiduciary duty to the stockholders is that that duty should be interpreted in light of what the stock-
holders would want. Thus, a creditor is not an adequate representative plaintiff in a derivative action. It may
also be that stockholders are precluded from direct action for other reasons. As a general rule, stockholders
cannot force a distribution of corporate assets. In effect, they agree to leave assets in corporate solution and rely
instead on their ability to sell their shares to others in order to exit the business. Thus, fiduciary duty (in
particular the duty of care) may be seen as the quid pro quo for forgoing the right to force dissolution and
liquidation.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Pepper, 308 U.S. at 307-08; Costello, 256 F.2d at 909. Thus, in practice, management's fiduci-
ary duty does in fact run to creditors because trustees can enforce such duties on behalf of creditors. One way
to resolve this puzzle is to relegate it to a question of jurisdiction. In other words, although state courts have
generally held that fiduciary duty runs to the stockholders only, the law that applies in federal bankruptcy
court is otherwise. The problem with that view is that the bankruptcy courts are supposed to apply the other-
wise applicable law. An alternative way to resolve this puzzle, is to think of the rule that fiduciary duty runs
only to the stockholders as a heuristic-a way for courts to sort out the meaning of fiduciary duty in a non-
bankruptcy setting. In other words, the courts do not really mean it when they say that fiduciary duty runs
only to the stockholders. What they mean is that as long as the corporation is solvent they will interpret
fiduciary duty as if it runs only to the stockholders, perhaps on the theory that creditors have nothing to
complain about in such circumstances, or that the stockholders can be trusted to protect the interests of
creditors, or that stockholders are the best position to assert such claims. There is a third possibility-that a
bankruptcy trustee should not ever be permitted to recover on grounds of breach of fiduciary duty.
10. This is an unusual situation in the United States because there is almost no disincentive for a corpora-
tion to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition. The situation is different in other countries. For example, in
Germany, a company must declare bankruptcy if its legal capital falls below statutory requirements. The direc-
tors are liable for any losses incurred if the company fails to do so. After declaring bankruptcy, operation of the
company must be turned over to a trustee. There is no such thing as a DIP. See Andreas Engert, Life Without
Legal Capital: Lessons from American Law 23-24 (Legal Capital in Eur. Working Paper Group, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882842. Accordingly, some German legal scholars find it difficult to imagine that
there could be any rule other than that the board of directors has a duty to maximize the value of the firm as a
whole. Thus, it seems clear that the precise contours of fiduciary duty depend on the whole of the legal and
business culture in which they operate. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2072-74 (2001). It may also be that the state courts have shied
away from such claims out of a sense that federal bankruptcy law somehow preempts the field. Although there
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I. CREDIT LYONNAIS BANK NEDERLAND, N.V. V.
PATHE COMMUNICATIONS CORP.
The courts have seldom discussed whether creditors have standing to assert claims
based on breach of fiduciary duty, because it is relatively unusual for a state court
to address issues that are usually handled by the federal bankruptcy courts, and
probably also because the issue is one that gives rise to rather strong feelings." In
short, the issue was the third rail of corporation law until 1991 when the Delaware
Court of Chancery issued its opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v.
Pathe Communications Corp." In that case, Chancellor Allen held that "where a
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not
merely the agent of the [stockholders], but owes its duty to the corporate enter-
prise."'3 In such circumstances, management is not disloyal in failing to act in the
interest of the stockholders. 4 Rather, management owes "supervening loyalty to...
the corporate entity."'" It has "an obligation to the community of interest that sus-
tain[s] the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to
maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity."6
In a fateful and now famous footnote, Chancellor Allen stated "[tihe possibility
of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of
opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors."' 7 He then pro-
ceeded to describe a situation in which the board of directors might be tempted to
gamble with the corporation's assets in order to maximize return to the stockhold-
ers under circumstances in which the creditors would suffer the loss in the event of
failure.' Specifically, he posits a situation in which a corporation has a single asset
consisting of a judgment against a solvent debtor. 9 There is a chance that the judg-
ment will either be modified or reversed on appeal. If the judgment is reversed the
corporation will be rendered insolvent.2" The debtor has offered to settle the claim
for an amount that would permit the corporation to pay off its own creditors but
should be little doubt that there is a role for state law here given that most states have statutes that authorize the
appointment of a receiver for a corporation on grounds of insolvency, the flurry of cases addressing the zone of
insolvency in Delaware and elsewhere would seem to confirm the matter.
11. There are also relatively few law review articles addressing the question. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduci-
ary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1510-13 (1993).
12. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). See also Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621
A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("[Wjhen the insolvency exception .. .arise[s], it creates fiduciary duties for
directors for the benefit of creditors.").
13. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613,
at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
14. id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *34 n.55.
18. Id.
19. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55.
20. Id.
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with little left over for the stockholders. If the judgment is affirmed the creditors
can be paid off and the stockholders will enjoy a significant return.' The stock-
holders would presumably prefer to decline the settlement and risk that the judg-
ment will be affirmed. The creditors would presumably prefer that the corporation
take the settlement. Chancellor Allen states (somewhat cryptically) that because the
board of directors has an obligation to maximize the value of the firm as a whole, it
should accept any settlement that is equal to or greater than the risk adjusted value
of the judgment.22 Thus, the duty of the board of directors is not an all-or-nothing
duty to any one constituency. 3
This concept is easily explained if one uses specific numbers. Suppose that a
corporation has one and only one asset, a judgment for $100 million, and liabilities
of $20 million. According to the corporation's lawyers, there is a twenty percent
chance that the judgment will be affirmed and an eighty percent chance that it will
be reversed. The risk-adjusted value of the judgment is shown in the following
chart:
PAYOFF PROBABILTY VALUE
AFFIRM 700 .20 20
REVERSE o .8o o
TOTAL 1 7.oo 20
The overall value of the judgment is just enough to pay off the creditors. The
creditors would presumably prefer that the corporation accept an offer to settle the
case for $20 million. But from the point of view of the stockholders, there is a
twenty percent chance that they will get $80 million if the judgment is affirmed and
the creditors are paid off. Thus, from their point of view the judgment is worth $16
million and they would reject any settlement of less than $36 million.
The point is that it is not apparent as to what the board of directors should do.
In Credit Lyonnais, Chancellor Allen says that the board of directors should maxi-
mize the value of the firm as a whole. 5 But that begs the question: What does it
21. Id.
22. Id. It is not clear that this is correct as a matter of logic. One could equally well say that because the
board of directors has an obligation to maximize the value of the firm, they should not accept a settlement
simply because it is equal to or greater than the risk adjusted value of the judgment.
23. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55. It is arguable that this statement is dictum. The plain-
tiffs claim was based on a purported contract by which a bank agreed to lend additional funds to a subsidiary
corporation if the parent and subsidiary paid down a specified amount of existing borrowings. The court held
that the agreement had never been executed by the bank, that it had been obtained through fraud, that the
agreed repayments had never been made, and that the subsidiary would have been under no obligation to
distribute funds to the parent if it had sold the assets in question.
24. Chancellor Allen's footnote sets forth an example with specific numbers, but the numbers are so
peculiar that the example is difficult to follow.
25. 1991 WL 277613, at *34.
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mean to maximize firm value in the zone of insolvency situation? Furthermore,
whose value should be maximized? Chancellor Allen says that the board of direc-
tors should take the deal.26 But that does not necessarily follow from a rule of value
maximization. Chancellor Allen may have meant to say that the board of directors
should first assure the survival of the firm, but that is not what he said. Moreover,
that is not an uncontroversial proposition. If the stockholders are well diversified,
they may not care whether the firm survives.27 Not surprisingly, Credit Lyonnais
gave rise to an avalanche of cases and commentary. As of April 1, 2006, Credit
Lyonnais has been cited in 45 other cases and in 157 law review articles.
II. PRODUCTION RESOURCES GROUP, L.L.C. V. NCT GROUP, INC.
In 2004, Vice Chancellor Strine sought to put the matter to rest in Production Re-
sources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.,2" a case in which a creditor sought the
appointment of a receiver for the debtor corporation or direct recovery from the
debtor corporation based on the theory that the board of directors owed a fiduciary
duty to the creditors of the corporation. In Production Resources, the debtor corpo-
ration had gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid payment to the complaining
creditor while at the same time expending corporate resources on generous salaries
and consulting contracts with the controlling stockholder and encumbering the
assets of the corporation.29 The court presumed that the debtor corporation was
insolvent as a result of its inability or refusal to satisfy an apparently valid
obligation.3"
Noting that some courts and commentators have interpreted Credit Lyonnais as
creating a new body of creditor rights, Strine argues that what Credit Lyonnais
really did was to extend the shield of the business judgment rule to decisions in
which the board seeks to maximize total firm value rather than just stockholder
value." In other words, Credit Lyonnais protects the board of directors from an
action by the stockholders grounded on the board's failure to seek an advantage for
the stockholders at the expense of creditors.32
Strine is probably correct in his interpretation of Credit Lyonnais, which involved
a controlling stockholder challenge to a board decision not to undertake a sale of
assets at fire sale prices in order to pay down an outstanding line of credit and
26. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55.
27. Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor Diversification Affects
Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAw. 429, 430 (1998); Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77
Cm.-KENT L. REV. 147, 155 (2001).
28. 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
29. Id. at 779-80.
30. Id. at 783-84.
31. Id. at 788.
32. Id. See also Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v. Allied Riser Commc'ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch.
2002) ("[Elven where the law recognizes that the duties of directors encompass the interests of creditors, there
is room for application of the business judgment rule.").
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avoid triggering a voting trust agreement by which the creditor would assume vot-
ing control of the corporation. If Production Resources had held simply that the
board of directors is protected by the business judgment rule in zone-of-insolvency
situations, there would be little more to say about it. The problem is that in Produc-
tion Resources a creditor sought to assert a positive claim against the board of direc-
tors. It is one thing to say that a stockholder has no claim if the board of directors
fails to maximize stockholder wealth, but it is quite another to say that a creditor
has a claim if the board of directors favors the stockholders at the expense of credi-
tors. The fact that stockholders have no remedy does not imply that creditors do
have a remedy. Nevertheless, Strine upheld the claim at least in part.3 Thus, al-
though at first blush it appears that Strine seeks to debunk the notion that Credit
Lyonnais broke new ground, Strine himself breaks that ground in Production Re-
sources. He then goes on to hold that Delaware General Corporation Law
§ 102(b)(7) protects the board of directors from such claims to the same extent
that it protects the directors from claims by stockholders.34 But Strine declines to
dismiss the complaint, because the plaintiff in this case pleaded specific facts that
suggest that the board may have acted disloyally or in bad faith.
Strine states that it is well-settled under case law that the board of directors owes
its fiduciary duty to the corporation as an entity and that, when a firm is insolvent,
the board of directors owes its fiduciary duty to the creditors because the creditors
have assumed the position of residual claimants.36
It is not clear, however, that stockholder wealth maximization is a bad rule even
if it sometimes leads the board to follow strategies that reduce creditor wealth.
Presumably, such a rule would lead to higher overall stock prices than would a rule
requiring maximization of firm value. And presumably stockholders as an investor
class would favor such a rule. Even though the rule would lead to bankruptcy in
some cases, diversified stockholders would still be better off because their gains
33. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 793-95.
34. Id. at 777.
35. Id. Strine also addresses two other related issues without deciding them. First, what is the pleading
standard that applies to a derivative claim by a creditor of an insolvent firm? Id. at 795-96. For example, must
the plaintiff plead that demand on the board is excused? Second, what does the direct and derivative distinction
mean when a firm is insolvent? Id. at 796-97. That is, are there circumstances in which a creditor plaintiff can
recover directly? As to the first question, he does not reach an answer because he holds that the plaintiff has
pleaded particularized facts raising questions about the good faith of the board in the sense that its efforts to
resist paying the plaintiff are difficult to justify on any rational basis. Id. at 800. This is somewhat curious in
that Strine himself has expressed doubt that waste can ever be the basis for overcoming the business judgment
rule. As to the second question, he declines to answer until all of the evidence has been presented at trial. Id. at
800-01. One further question that is left unanswered by Production Resources is why the defendant company
was not in bankruptcy. The simple answer may be that it takes three creditors to file a petition for involuntary
bankruptcy.
36. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 787. Curiously, Strine cites Revlon as support for this proposition. Id. at
787 n.48. He also notes that Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003), may be to the
contrary. Id. at 788 n.51. In other words, Strine seems to agree with the notion that Credit Lyonnais affords
fiduciary rights to creditors. His only disagreement seems to be with the characterization of such rights as new.
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would outweigh their losses. And creditors will presumably respond to a rule of
stockholder wealth maximization by insisting on contractual protections designed
to contain such strategies. 7 Moreover, if the default rule is one that requires max-
imization of firm value, it is not clear that stockholders can do anything to impose
a rule that maximizes stockholder value. Aside from the fact that the default rule
would likely be seen as mandatory, it is difficult to see how one could reduce a rule
of stockholder wealth maximization to contract. This suggests that the rule of
stockholder wealth maximization is not so much about stockholder welfare as it is
about ensuring that the burden of contracting is clearly imposed on creditors.38
III. MIND THE GAP
Strine argues that creative lawyers and scholars have used Credit Lyonnais to fill
non-existent gaps in the coverage of fiduciary duty. 9 But it is also possible to inter-
pret Credit Lyonnais as holding that there are desirable gaps in the law. As I have
argued elsewhere, the supposed duty of the board of directors to maximize stock-
holder wealth is one that is honored mostly in the breach.4" The only situation in
which the board of directors is held to such a duty is a situation in which the sale
or break-up of the company appears to be inevitable." In other situations, the
board is free to pursue an adequate profit for the stockholders even though it may
be clear that the stockholders would prefer for the board to maximize stockholder
value. But the board of directors may be held liable if it invests the assets of the
corporation in a way that is sure to lose money or break even at best.42 In short, the
board of directors is under an obligation to try to make a profit, but not necessarily
the maximum profit. Thus, the board of directors may legitimately choose to seek
less profit at less risk even though it is clear that stockholders prefer a more aggres-
sive strategy.43 There is nothing that the stockholders can do about this as a matter
of law. But a company that fails to maximize stockholder value may become the
37. See Met. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1526, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated, 906 F.2d
884 (2d Cir. 1990).
38. See Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 140,
157 (1994).
39. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d. at 789. Or as Gig Young was wont to say in Lovers and Other Strangers, "No
gap here." LovERS AND OTHER STRANGERS (Am. Broad. Co. 1970).
40. See Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders, supra note 27, at 463-73 (discuss-
ing supposed duty to maximize stockholder value); Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions, 2 A.L.I. § 2.01 (1992) (corporation should be managed so as to enhance corporate profit and shareholder
gain). Regarding the peculiar notion of an unenforceable duty, the breach of which gives rise to no cause of
action, see Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162, 175 (2d Cit. 2002).
41. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
42. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983)
and Baldwin v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Selheimer v, Manganese Corp. of Am., 224 A.2d 634, 644 (Pa. 1966);
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940).
43. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 886; Principles of Corp. Governance, supra note 40, at § 2.01 cmt. f.
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target of a takeover. In other words, the market provides sufficient discipline
here-there is no need for fiduciary duty."
As for the interests of creditors, it is unlikely that a corporation in a zone-of-
insolvency situation would opt to bet the farm in the real world. As in Credit Lyon-
nais, a CEO would likely reason that he must keep the company afloat to keep his
job.4" Thus, most CEOs would likely be inclined to accept a settlement even if it was
only a break even deal.46 The CEO might even try to negotiate with the creditors to
see if they would accept some lesser amount. 7
44. This assumes that the company is publicly traded. The optimal rule may be otherwise for a closely held
corporation or if the stockholders are unable to diversify. In such a situation, the stockholders are likely to be
concerned about both risk and return. See, e.g., Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 589-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). To
be sure, statutory corporation law is largely the same whether or not there is a public market for shares, leaving
aside the statutory close corporation election and various isolated provisions such as MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT.
§ 7.32 and § 14.34 (2005). Thus, one not-very-good argument for a rule of firm wealth maximization is that
we need a rule that works for all companies. On the other hand, the courts have been quite willing to fashion
the law of fiduciary duty around the existence (or not) of a market for the shares of a corporation. See Dona-
hue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518-19 (Mass. 1975).
45. On the other hand, a board of directors consisting mostly of independent directors may not be averse
to taking a big risk. The board of directors, as a board, has little to lose (or gain) other than possibly being held
liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. Moreover, if fiduciary duty is interpreted to require stockholder wealth
maximization or is widely thought to so require, there is some chance that making the wrong decision could
give rise to liability. So the law may matter here. To be sure, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2001) may
protect the directors against most good faith mistakes. But knowing failure to maximize stockholder wealth
could be seen as a breach of good faith and thus remain actionable. This raises a further question-what is the
role of the board vis a vis the CEO? The board of directors is seldom in a position to manage a business
actively. The board of directors can approve or reject strategies proposed by the CEO, but it cannot realistically
devise and execute a business strategy on its own. If the circumstances are such that the board of directors can
manage the corporation, and it chooses to do so, then the board is presumably subject to the entire range of
fiduciary duties, including (possibly) a duty to maximize stockholder wealth. But the statutes permit the board
of directors to assume a more supervisory role. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.01(b) (2000); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 3.02 (1992). Realistically, a supervisory
board cannot maximize stockholder wealth. It can only encourage the CEO to do so and veto strategies and
deals that reduce stockholder wealth. To be sure, there may be situations in which the board of directors can do
more. As illustrated by Revlon, one such situation is the sale or breakup of the company. In such circumstances,
the board of directors is in a good position to act as auctioneer and to guard against efforts by the CEO to
manipulate the process, because the goal is clearly defined. If this is the correct view, then there is a subtle
danger in the notion that an independent board of directors is a good thing particularly in combination with
the notion that the goal of the board should be to maximize stockholder wealth. It is precisely the danger that
Chancellor Allen describes in Footnote 55. Thus, the ideal board of directors may be one with a significant
equity stake as championed by Charles Elson. See Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation - A Board-
Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937 (1993); Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-
Captured Board - The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1996); Charles M. Elson, The
Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 (1995). See also R. Franklin Balotti, et
al., Equity Ownership and the Duty of Care: Convergence, Revolution, or Evolution? 55 Bus. LAw. 661 (2000);
Sanjai Bhagat, et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW. 885
(1999).
46. That is essentially what happened in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
But the Delaware Supreme Court held that the board was required to consider a subsequent offer that would
give more to the common stockholders despite an otherwise enforceable contract to take the first offer. Id. at
936.
47. It is worth pondering whether the CEO might even be precluded by fiduciary duty from negotiating
with the stockholders to see if they would accept a lesser payout. Some commentators seem to suggest that
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If this is the correct view then it is simply wrong to say that creditors gain stand-
ing to assert claims based on breach of fiduciary duty when a corporation is in the
zone-of-insolvency or is in fact insolvent. Creditors may accede to the same status
as stockholders in such circumstances, but neither has a cognizable claim about
whether or not the board of directors should seek to maximize the value of the
firm. In other words, there is nothing special about a zone-of-insolvency situation.
Stockholders cannot ordinarily assert claims based on failure to maximize stock-
holder wealth, nor can they do so in the zone-of-insolvency. 8 Moreover and more
problematic, extending the benefits of fiduciary duty to creditors under any cir-
cumstances leads to intractable conflicts and ultimately back into the confusion
created by Credit Lyonnais in the first place.
First, as Strine clearly and correctly recognizes in Production Resources, stock-
holders enjoy some potential for gain even in an insolvent business if it rebounds to
a value in excess of creditor claims.49 Thus, the board of directors presumably con-
tinues to have some sort of duty to the stockholders of an insolvent firm. Accord-
fiduciary duty should constrain managers from seeking excessive pay at least in the absence of a truly indepen-
dent compensation committee. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 751 (2002). If so, this is another argument for not
extending fiduciary duty to creditors. Again, stockholders are adequately protected from unduly conservative
management by the threat of takeover.
48. There is a potential problem with this interpretation of Footnote 55. Some scholars have argued that
the rule of Revlon is focused on end period transactions in which the board of directors should not consider
the long-term interests of the firm or stockholders because sale or break-up is inevitable. See Charles M. Elson
& Robert B. Thompson, The Limits Of Judicially Enforced Constraints And The Promise Of Proprietary Incen-
tives, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 582 (2002). One could characterize a Footnote 55 situation as such a predicament
in the sense that as far as the stockholders are concerned there is no reason to think about the long-term. But
one could equally well characterize a Footnote 55 situation as one in which the long term survival of the firm is
a central concern. That is, the board could choose to maximize stockholder wealth (or not) free of Revlon
constraints. One possible interpretation of Footnote 55 is that Chancellor Allen intended it as an argument
from absurdity for the extension of fiduciary duty to creditors in the zone of insolvency. It may be that what
Allen meant to say was: (1) if there is no fiduciary duty to creditors in such circumstances, the board of
directors might see itself as required to bet the farm for the benefit of the stockholders, (2) that is clearly an
absurd result, and (3) therefore there must be a fiduciary duty to creditors under such circumstances. Indeed,
some commentators have argued that the only sensible rule is one that requires or at least encourages directors
to maximize firm value. Any other rule, they argue, is suboptimal from a societal point of view. See Andreas
Engert, Life Without Legal Capital: Lessons from American Law 23-24 (Legal Capital in Eur. Working Paper
Group, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882842. I have argued myself that the duty of care should
be interpreted as running to the company rather than as running to the stockholders. See Booth, Stockholders,
Stakeholders, and Bagholders, supra note 27, at 430. My point however, consistent with my position here, is not
that stockholder wealth maximization is the wrong norm, but rather that in most circumstances it can be
enforced only by the market. Another possible interpretation of Footnote 55, or at least another basis on which
the case could have been decided if the financing agreement were enforceable, is that the decision not to sell
assets at fire-sale prices was in fact one designed to maximize stockholder wealth over the long haul and that
the board simply ignored the peculiar interests of one particular stockholder who was more concerned with
maintaining control. Credit Lyonnais could be interpreted as a potential entrenchment case and, as such, quite
within mainstream doctrine. One problem with this interpretation is that it makes the footnote superfluous.
That is not necessarily a problem in the real world, but as a matter of academic interest, the footnote is the
issue. It does no good to dismiss it as dictum.
49. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d. 772, 776-77 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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ingly, Strine holds that fiduciary duty in insolvency runs to both stockholders and
creditors."0 In doing so, he thus rejects the so-called trust fund theory that the duty
of the board of directors is merely to marshal the assets of an insolvent firm. But
what happens when the interests of the stockholders and the creditors conflict? It is
not at all difficult to imagine a situation in which a firm that is in fact insolvent has
a risky opportunity that carries the potential of gain for the stockholders. In other
words, it is easy to extend Chancellor Allen's logic to a firm that is in fact insolvent.
Second, if fiduciary duty extends to creditors, what is to keep creditors from
overreaching? Strine himself worries that if we find a fiduciary duty to creditors in
the zone of insolvency, creditors may use their rights to assert claims against firms
that turn out to be solvent and that creditors, for example, may use their standing
to get discovery and otherwise disrupt business."' The same worry arises if creditors
have standing to assert fiduciary claims when a firm is in fact insolvent, because it
is unclear whether decisions that result in insolvency may also be actionable. In
other words, Production Resources itself may expose the board of directors to credi-
tor claims about the conduct of business before insolvency. It seems clear that there
should be some limit on the ability of creditors to pursue claims against the board
of directors, but where does one draw the line? To say that a duty to creditors arises
only when the firm becomes insolvent is hollow protection. But to posit a duty in
the zone of insolvency is to open a can of worms.52
50. Id. at 789.
51. Id. at 789-91.
52. Again, these issues are likely to arise only in cases in which a trustee has been appointed. It seems
unlikely that a DIP would assert such claims. To be sure, we could rely somewhat on the discretion of the
trustee about what claims to pursue. But it would be easier to do so if it were clear that fiduciary duty is off
limits. Bankruptcy law struggles somewhat with these problems too. Although there seems to be little doubt
that trustees in bankruptcy do assert claims based on fiduciary duty, bankruptcy law also holds that the duty of
the board of directors is the same in bankruptcy as outside bankruptcy. In addition, bankruptcy law may
recognize the claims of stockholders in situations in which new value is created while also holding directors
accountable for decisions that result in deepening insolvency. See generally Eric BRUNSTAD, Jr., Bankruptcy and
the Problems of Economic Futility: A Theory on the Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 Bus. LAw. 499 (2000); see
also Sabin Willett, The Shallows of Deepening Insolvency, 60 Bus. LAW. 549, 552-57 (2005). In short, the role of
the board of directors of an insolvent corporation is fraught with conflicts even as a matter of bankruptcy law.
But the-conflicts that arise in bankruptcy may be the result of ambiguity in state law. Presumably, the bank-
ruptcy courts would be required to follow clearly articulated state law to the effect that creditors have no
standing to assert claims sounding in fiduciary duty under any circumstances. See, e.g., In re RSL COM Prime-
call, Inc., Nos. 01-11457 and 01-11469, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1635 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003) (debtor
corporation's claim that directors breached their fiduciary duty by not liquidating upon insolvency failed be-
cause the decision to postpone a bankruptcy filing was subject to the business judgment rule); Floyd v. Hefner,
No. H-03-5693, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70922, at *20-21 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2006) (former directors of debtor
did not owe creditors any broad fiduciary duties under Texas common law, so decision to mortgage debtor's
assets was actionable only if trustee established violation of a legal obligation that caused damage). See also
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174, 206-07 (Del. Ch. 2006) (creditors failed
to plead facts showing that directors or third party advisers had a disloyal motive, that they were less than
diligent, or that they misunderstood their roles; court refused to embrace the deepening insolvency claim
characterizing it as a hopeful prediction of state law by federal courts). Thus, the answer to the question
whether the board of directors owes a fiduciary duty to creditors has implications not just for those rare cases
in which state courts must address fiduciary duty in insolvency, but also for common cases in which bank-
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Finally, and closely related, it is not clear when one is in the zone-of-insolvency.
In a world of diversified investors who favor focused, non-diversified companies,
many choices about basic business strategy may turn out to be bet-the-farm deci-
sions. A company that is serious about seeking to maximize stockholder wealth is
likely to face such choices as a routine matter. If creditors can recover when that
strategy fails, and it often will, few companies will in fact seek to maximize stock-
holder wealth.
In short, Production Resources resolves nothing. Indeed, it raises many more
questions than it answers. What Strine should have said was that creditors simply
cannot assert claims sounding in fiduciary duty under any circumstances, while
making it clear that the board of directors is protected by the business judgment
rule from any claim that they failed to maximize stockholder wealth outside a Rev-
lon53 situation. Instead, by holding that fiduciary duty extends to creditors in insol-
vency and recognizing that the board of directors continues to owe a duty to
stockholders even in insolvency,5 Strine left open the possibility of conflicting in-
terpretations as to the meaning of fiduciary duty in insolvency.
IV. WHAT IS GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING?
Does this mean that the board of directors has no duty of any kind to creditors and
that it can never be held liable to creditors no matter how egregiously it has .be-
haved? Certainly not. Creditors can always seek appointment of a receiver.55 Al-
though the burden is on creditors to protect themselves, they are also protected by
the duty of good faith and fair dealing that all parties to a contract owe to each
other.56 In one sense, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is similar to fiduciary
duty-it is an open-ended duty whose requirements cannot be fully stated in ad-
vance. Like fiduciary duty, it has that you-know-it-when-you-see-it quality. Never-
theless, the courts have been reluctant to find that much of anything violates the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, perhaps because they find it difficult to distin-
guish the duty from fiduciary duty.57 Moreover, courts have recently begun to find
that fiduciary duty includes a duty of good faith, 8 thus further confusing things.
ruptcy courts must determine whether a trustee has standing to assert claims sounding in fiduciary duty and if
so whether his standing extends to the entire range of fiduciary duty or is limited (for example) to duty of
loyalty claims or some subset thereof. See also Bank of Am. v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 798- 99 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (creditor bank and receiver could not sue insolvent company's officers or directors for breach of
fiduciary duty to recover defaulted loan amounts in absence of allegations of self-dealing).
53. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
54. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 787-91 (Del. Ch. 2004).
55. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4.32 (2000) (both expressly recog-
nizing the standing of creditors).
56. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). Ironically, it has been
incorrectly argued that Wood amounts to the imposition of a fiduciary duty in the context of a contract
granting an exclusive license. See, e.g., Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
57. See, e.g., Mellencamp, 689 F. Supp. at 1156-59.
58. Id.
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So is there anything certain regarding the duty of good faith and fair dealing?
One thing is clear-it must be somehow different from fiduciary duty if we want to
avoid falling into the morass of the zone of insolvency. In addition, as we have seen
here, creditors should have no standing to assert a claim that management failed to
seek a profit or to maximize that profit. Thus, incidental harm to creditors cannot
constitute a breach of duty to creditors.5 9 On the other hand, the intentional diver-
sion of creditor wealth to stockholders would seem to cross the line. For example, it
would seem to constitute a breach of good faith and fair dealing for the board of
directors to drive down the value of the corporation's bonds in order to buy them
back at bargain-basement prices and thereby generate stockholder gain." Similarly,
if the corporation arranges its affairs in such a way as to render it unable to pay one
or more creditors, that too would seem to cross the line. In both cases, such tactics
amount to simple refusal to pay an obligation recognized as valid as in Production
Resources. But in such cases it would seem that the express remedy of receivership
under the state corporation law is adequate to the task and that the availability of
an express remedy precludes the implication of other remedies such as those availa-
ble for breach of fiduciary duty.6
For the most part, creditors are adequately protected from abusive tactics de-
signed to enrich stockholders at creditor expense. The rules relating to distributions
by corporations together with fraudulent transfer law and the law of receivership
more or less assure that there remains value in the corporation and that creditors
will eventually get paid to the extent that the corporation can pay.62 It is somewhat
odd that creditors have no standing to assert claims based on corporation law as it
relates to distributions, but it is easy for a creditor to negotiate for well defined
limitations in this connection. Inasmuch as such claims are statutory and not based
on fiduciary duty, they are presumably fair game for a trustee in bankruptcy.
Moreover, fraudulent transfer law covers all of the situations that are covered by the
rules relating to distributions.63 To be sure, there is nothing in either of these re-
gimes that addresses the problem of gambling with creditor wealth. Indeed, the fact
that there is no such limitation enshrined in fraudulent transfer law-which explic-
59. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (board of
directors must maximize stockholder wealth in the sale of a corporation even if creditors are harmed in the
process). Indeed, it is difficult to see how the board of directors can be said to have an obligation to maximize
stockholder wealth under any circumstances-even if it does entail betting with the money of others-if the
board also has a fiduciary duty to creditors under any circumstances.
60. See Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1058-59 (Del. Ch. 1987). See also Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1053 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983)
(construing rights of bondholders to accelerate in circumstances in which it appeared that sale of assets might
be part of a scheme to drive down value of bonds).
61. In Delaware, the Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction over such cases unless they involve a breach of
fiduciary duty. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, No. Civ. A. 1456-N, 2006
WL 2588971, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006).
62. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 199 (Del. Ch. 2006) (discussing
remedies available to injured creditors under fraudulent transfer and receivership laws).
63. Id.
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itly addresses transactions that leave a business undercapitalized-suggests a posi-
tive policy decision.
It is perhaps arguable that creditors, in contrast to shareholders, need the protec-
tions of fiduciary duty in cases in which those who control the corporation seek to
favor themselves. The situation in Production Resources comes to mind, but here
too fraudulent transfer law seems equal to the task. If the terms of an insider trans-
action are unfair, the transaction can be attacked under fraudulent transfer law
equally as well as a matter of fiduciary duty.64 And even if the terms are fair, the
deal can often be avoided as a matter of bankruptcy law. Thus, there is no identifi-
able benefit from extending the protections of fiduciary duty to creditors. Indeed,
the protections afforded by fiduciary duty may be narrower than those that credi-
tors otherwise enjoy. Be that as it may, the confusion that results from the exten-
sion of fiduciary duty is significant.6"
CONCLUSION
In the end, it seems clear that fiduciary duty should remain focused on and limited
to stockholders. Creditors have no need for its protections even though they might
prefer a rule that favors them when the board of directors is tempted to endorse a
risky business strategy. As things stand, such decisions are left to the unquestiona-
ble discretion of the board of directors-the stockholders cannot challenge such
decisions. Therefore, neither should the creditors be able to do so. Luckily, the
cases thus far in which creditors have prevailed are cases in which they should have
prevailed anyway under fraudulent transfer law. Nevertheless, there remains a sub-
stantial body of case law which indicates creditors can assert fiduciary duty claims.
Until recently, most such decisions have come from the bankruptcy courts.66 The
state courts that have primary jurisdiction with regard to the interpretation of cor-
poration law have had few opportunities to say otherwise. Still the decisions of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in Credit Lyonnais and Production Resources have gen-
erally affirmed the idea that the protections of fiduciary duty extend to creditors at
least when a corporation is in fact insolvent. These decisions have encouraged
further loose talk from the bankruptcy courts in an area in which they are already
64. Id.
65. For example, many courts and commentators have suggested that the duty to creditors arises only in
cases in which directors have violated the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp.
2d 792, 798-99 (E.D. Va. 2002) (creditor bank and receiver could not sue insolvent company's officers or
directors for breach of fiduciary duty to recover defaulted loan amounts in absence of allegations of self-
dealing). But such claims invariably also run afoul of fraudulent transfer law. The fact that a stockholder would
have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty may be an interesting coincidence, but it does not imply that creditors
have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
66. See, e.g., SubMicron Sys. Holdings I Inc. v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.),
432 F.3d 448, 463 n.17 (3d Cir. 2006); Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005);
Carrieri v. Jobs.com Inc., 393 F.3d 508, 534 n.24 (5th Cir. 2004); Diaz v. Ozarowski (In re Ozarowski), No. 02-
52981 (RTL), 2006 WL 3694547, at *7 (Bankr. D. N.J. Dec. 12, 2006); In re Romano, Nos. 04-11263-JNF and
05-16880-RS, 2006 WL 3081034, at '17 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 30, 2006).
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challenged by applying state law in a difficult context. The law would be better
served if the courts made it clear once and for all that fiduciary duty is about the
stockholders and no one else.
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